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Abstract  
This paper analyzes the determinants of life insurance development on a panel of 20 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1996-2011. It also highlights the role of the 
institutions quality on the effect of economic development on the life insurance. Controlling 
for the presence of a possible endogeneity bias using the instrumental variable technique, we 
find evidence that increased of per capita income leads to an increase in life insurance 
premiums. We show that the life insurance is a luxury good in SSA. The demographic 
variables such as life expectancy and the young dependency ratio influence negatively the life 
insurance development while the old dependency ratio has a positive effect. We also find 
that the protection of property rights and the government stability are positively associated 
to life insurance. The results are robust to the introduction of more variables. Furthermore, 
the marginal impact of the income per capita on the life insurance varies according to the 
quality of the legal and political environment. Finally, the marginal effect of the economic 
development on life insurance is less for french legal system countries compared to non-
french legal system countries. 
Key words: Life insurance, economic development, institutional quality, instrumental variable 
JEL codes: G22, 011, L60, C26 
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1. Introduction 
Deepening of the financial systems requires not only an increase in the quantity of the services 
offered, but also an improvement in the "quality" of services offered, in order to better meet the 
different needs of economic agents. This is at a time to extend the duration of credits, to improve 
access for households and small and small enterprises (financial inclusion) and diversify the 
supply of financial services, including insurance services. The development of insurance services 
contributes to stimulate the growth in developing countries (Arena, 2008). In this context, the life 
insurance plays a special role because it allows at a time the supply of insurance service and long-
term saving mobilization.  
Life insurance is one that covers the risks relating to the length of human life. There are two 
categories of life insurance products: the insurance against the premature death of the insured 
and the rent contract (old-age insurance) which provides for the periodic payment of income to 
the insured for a specified period of time or more often during the life of the insured (Vaughan 
and Vaughan, 2003). While the most important function of life insurance is to provide financial 
assistance to beneficiaries’ in case of premature death of the insured, the aim of the rent is to 
assure the continuity of incomes for the insured during the period of inactivity (retirement). Thus, 
the life insurance plays an important role in the financial planning of individuals because it can 
be used as a hedge against the financial uncertainty resulting from the mortality risks incurred. 
Life insurance is also an important mean by which the individuals with relatively low incomes 
can save and invest efficiently in the long run. Indeed, the life insurance is a saving contract 
relatively simple that can be freely bought and regularly by small amounts. With the regular 
character or contractual of premiums payment by the policyholders, the life insurance companies 
arrive to mobilize the significant saving and stable compared to other financial systems. Thus, in 
pooling the saving of small and large investors, the life insurance companies accumulate stable 
resources that can be used for heavy and risky investments that are beneficial to the economy 
(Dickinson, 2000). In this way, the life insurance is an important instrument for economic 
development. 
Life insurance companies’ activities have experienced an important development over the recent 
years. Indeed, the life insurance penetration (total life insurance premiums as a percentage of 
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GDP) at the world level rose from 3.8% in 1996 to 4.6 % in 2000 and decrease to 3.6% in 2011 
following at the financial crisis. According to the life insurance density (life insurance premiums 
per capita), it increased from 207$ US per capita in 1996 to about 367$ US in 2011 (Swiss Re, 
2013). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the life insurance sector is not yet well developed as in the others 
areas economics. Indeed, in 2011, the share of Africa in the world market of the life insurance 
was only 1.79% against 35.9% in Europe, 35.28% in Asia, 22.75% in North America and 2.49% 
in Latin America and Caribbean. Moreover, we note that, the countries of OECD detain 
approximately 83.24% of the market in 2011 and 13.97% for the emerging countries and 2.79% 
for the rest of developing countries. However, despite the marginal share of Africa in the world 
life insurance market, we observe an important evolution of the sector. Direct life insurance 
premiums in Africa increased from 16.444 trillion $ US in 1996 to 46.261trillion $ US in 2011, 
which shows that the turnover of life insurance companies has been doubled in less than twenty 
years. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the life insurance penetration rose from 0.1505% in 1996 to 
0.252% in 2011, whether a growth of life insurance premiums  of about 67.44% over the period. 
Regarding the life insurance density, it rose from 0.856 $ US per capita to 4,092 $ US over the 
same period. This shows that the life insurance sector is increasing in the financial sphere and 
constitutes an important potential source of mobilization of long-term resources and financing of 
enterprises. Thus, it appears therefore necessary to identify the factors likely to influence the life 
insurance sector development in the Sub-Saharan Africa countries. 
The previous researches on the determinants of life insurance sector development have not 
devoted more attention to the role of institutional factors. Indeed, the studies such as those of La 
Porta et al. (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998) showed that the legal system’s affect the 
development of the financial system. Thus, the fact that the life insurance is a contractual 
relationship implies that the quality of the legal and policy environment could have a significant 
effect on the development of the sector, including strengthening the credibility of life insurance 
contracts. The authors such as Ward and Zurbruegg (2002), Beck and Webb (2003); Esho and al; 
(2004), Chang and Lee (2012) and Dragos and Dragos (2013) analyzed the effects of the quality 
of institutions on the life insurance penetration and its density. It appears from these studies that 
institutional factors such as the civil liberties, the political stability, and the protection of property 
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rights and the regulatory quality and the obligations of both parties to the contract, the rule of law 
and the control of corruption have a positive effect on the life insurance development. 
However, most of previous research (Beck and Webb, 2003; Feyen and al, 2011; Lee and Chiu, 
2012; Chang and Lee, 2012) were more focused in developed and emerging countries and there 
have been a few studies that have examined the factors that determine the life insurance sector 
development in Sub-Saharan African countries. Furthermore, most of the empirical researches 
have less examined the effects of institutional factors that influence the life insurance demand 
and supply. Our study therefore seeks to identify the determinants of life insurance development 
the one hand and other hand to analyze the role of the institutions quality in the economic 
development effect on life insurance activities in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
We contribute to the literature on many levels. First, at best our knowledge, this study represents 
one of the first to analyze the determinants of the life insurance sector, taking into account the 
role of institutional factors in a sample of 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa
1
. Thus, we examine 
the heterogeneity in the economic development effect according to the institutions quality. 
Second, the paper takes advantage of a recently released database that allow taking into account 
both demand and supply factors of life insurance over the period from 1996 to 2011. Thirdly, 
contrary to previous studies (Outreville, 1996; Beck and Webb, 2003; Feyen and al, 2011), this 
study estimates the fixed effect panel model with the heteroskedastic-efficient two-step 
generalized method of moments (IV-GMM) estimator which generates efficient coefficients as 
well as consistent standard errors estimates. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section highlights the literature on 
economic, demographic and institutional determinants of life insurance development; the third 
section presents the variables and the stylized facts in Sub-Saharan Africa, the econometric 
methodology and the estimation technique are discussed in section fourth; the empirical results 
and the discussions following in section fifth and a conclusion is presented in the last section.  
2. The arguments of the determinants of life insurance consumption 
                                                 
 
 
1
 Were excluded South Africa from our study because its insurance sector is well developed as some developed 
countries and represents more than 80% market share of the Sub-Saharan region. 
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In this section we propose a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants 
of life insurance sector development. 
Theoretical models on the life insurance consumption were mainly developed by Yarri (1965), 
Hakansson (1969), Fisher (1973) and Lewis (1989). Indeed, Yaari (1965) have developed a 
theoretical model to study the problem of the uncertain life time. In this context, the life 
insurance demand is attributed to a person's desire to bequeath funds to his dependents and 
provide income for retirement. It is derived from the maximization of an individual utility 
function (Beck and Webb, 2003). Thus, this model assumes that the life insurance demand to be a 
function of wealth, expected income over an individual's lifetime, the level of interest rates, the 
cost of life insurance policies (administrative costs), assumed subjective discount rate for current 
and future consumption.  
Lewis (1989) extends the model developed by Yaari by explicitly incorporating the preferences 
of other family member’s dependents and beneficiaries. Specifically, he derives the life insurance 
demand as a maximization problem of the beneficiaries, the spouse and the offspring of the life 
insurance policyholder. Deriving utility maximization by both spouse and offspring separately 
and assuming no bequest by the policyholder and an isoelastic utility function, Lewis shows that 
the total life insurance demand can be written as follows: 
            {[             ]         }        
Where   is the policy loading factor (the ratio of the life insurance costs its actuarial value),   the 
probability of the primary wage earner’s death,   the face value of all life insurance written on 
the primary wage earner’s life,   a measure of the beneficiaries’ relative risk aversion,    the 
present value of consumption of each offspring until he/she leaves the household and of the 
spouse over his/her predicted remaining life time and   the household’s net wealth (Beck and 
Webb, 2003). However, Lewis noted that the life insurance consumption is not only motived by 
consumer’s demand. The price is probably the decisive factor in the life insurance consumption. 
Several important factors such as the urbanization level, the monetary stability, the bureaucratic 
quality, the rule of law, the control of corruption and banking sector development all impact the 
insurer's ability to provide cost-effective insurance. In the model of Lewis, described above, these 
factors can be represented by the policy loading factors. 
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In summary, the theoretical studies identify the variables such as the income, the interest rate, the 
current consumption and the wealth as variables that influence the life insurance consumption. 
Demographic and social variables were also included in the theoretical models and their potential 
impact on individual’s decision to use life insurance has been investigated. Thus, the life 
insurance consumption increases with the probability of death of the main breadwinner in the 
family like the head of the family, the level of current consumption of the family and the degree 
of risk aversion. However, there is no presentation of the mechanisms by which other economic 
and non-economic variables affect the life insurance activities. 
In what follows, we highlight the results of some studies on the effects of macroeconomic, 
demographic and institutional factors on the life insurance development.  
At the level of the macroeconomic determinants of the life insurance premiums, most of the 
previous studies showed that income per capita measuring the economic development level is the 
main determinant. The income is an essential variable in the life insurance consumption and this 
is justified by the necessity to maintain an income level to his descendants in the case of 
premature death. The studies of Fortune (1973), Beenstock and al. (1986), Browne and Kim 
(1993) and Outreville (1996) have shown that the life insurance development is positively 
influenced by the income per capita.  
However, many of those studies have shown that the effect of income on the life insurance 
depends of economic development level. Indeed, Truett and Truett (1990) have compared the life 
insurance demand in Mexico and United States during the period 1964-1984. They found that the 
income elasticity of life insurance consumption is higher in Mexico than in the US and conclude 
that life insurance is a necessity good. Then, Enz (2000) have developed a logistic model to 
identify the factors of supply and demand that are likely to influence the life insurance 
penetration (90 countries) over the period 1970-1998. He showed that the income elasticities of 
life insurance penetration are not constant and that the relationship between the life insurance 
penetration and real GDP per capita has a form "S" called "S-curve Model». Thus, the income 
elasticity of life insurance penetration is near unity both for the high and low levels of income, 
but very high for middle- income level. Feyen and al. (2011) also found that the life insurance 
consumption generally varies with the income. They showed that the very wealthy groups of 
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individuals may not need the life insurance because they have excess financial assets while those 
very poor have not the means to purchase the life insurance products. In addition, they find that 
the life insurance is a luxury good for the poor family. Lee and Chiu (2012) used a PSTR (Panel 
Smooth Threshold Regression) model to examine the nonlinear relationship between life 
insurance penetration and income. Firstly, they fund that there is a nonlinear relationship between 
the life insurance premiums and income per capita and this relationship following a curve "J". 
Then, the income elasticity of life insurance premiums is inferior to unity. This means that life 
insurance is a necessity good. Finally, they found that the income elasticity of life insurance 
premiums vary according to country and that is due to the heterogeneity of economic 
development of different countries in their sample.  
Although, the income is the main determinant of life insurance consumption, the literature has 
also analyzed the role of the quality of institutions. The life insurance is being primarily a 
contract linking the insurer and the policyholder and constituting one of the great investments on 
the stock markets, the quality of the institutional environment appears as an important variable in 
the promotion the life insurance activities (Lee and Chang, 2012). For example, an inability to 
appeal the violation of life insurance contracts by insurers reduced the value of these contracts for 
consumers and can deter them to subscribe of important sums for life insurance products (Beck 
and Webb, 2003). Thus, the lack of property protection and contract enforcement impedes life 
insurers' ability to invest efficiently and control the price of their products. Knack and Keefer 
(1995 and 2002) have shown that, the strengthening of property rights can generate a motivation 
to subscribe to a life insurance. This is justified by the fact that the effective enforcement of legal 
rules relating to property rights helps to protect life insurance policyholders against the losses or 
the damages. Esho and al. (2004) also showed that a favorable legal environment and protection 
of property rights favor the life insurance market development by reducing the risk transfer 
transaction costs. Avram and al. (2010) found that the quality of the legal system and the 
protection of property rights exert a significant effect on the life insurance development.  
Furthermore, the lack of political stability can shorten the economic horizon for potential 
purchasers and suppliers of life insurance products and thus may discouraged the life insurance 
market development (Beck and Webb, 2003). Ward and Zurbruegg (2002) have shown that the 
political stability has a positive effect on the life insurance business development at a time in 
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developed and developing economies. Moreover, Dragos and Dragos (2013) analyzed the role of 
institutional factors in the promotion of life insurance activities on a sample of 31 European 
countries. According to them, for that the life insurance sector emerges, it is necessary to have a 
favorable legal environment. Then, the results show that, the freedom to undertake influences 
positively the life insurance density, the easing of the tax burden stimulates the life insurance 
penetration and finally, a low level of corruption increases the life insurance density. 
Following the studies on the effects of economic development on the life insurance sector 
development, Chang and Lee (2012)
2
 have analyzed the role of institutional factors on the 
relationship between economic development and life insurance development from a dynamic 
panel threshold effect (PTR). They show that the income per capita influences positively the life 
insurance activities development and the effect is more important in high-income countries than 
in low-income countries. They also find that the legal and political indicators have a positive 
effect on life insurance in low-income countries, but the effect is marginal in high-income 
countries which means that the role of institutions on the life insurance development decreases 
with the economic development level.  
In addition to indicators of economic and institutional development, the literature has also 
identified other factors that influence the life insurance development. Outreville (1996), Beck and 
Webb (2003) found that in addition to income, the level of financial development positively 
affects the life insurance consumption while inflation negatively influences this one in developed 
and developing countries. Regarding the socio-demographic determinants, the variables such as 
the school enrollment, the life expectancy at birth, the young and old dependency ratios, the size 
of social security system, the share of public health expenditure were used in the literature as 
determinants of life insurance development. Indeed, Browne and Kim (1993) found that the life 
expectancy is not an important factor of life insurance consumption. However, some of the 
previous studies have shown that the life expectancy positively affects the life insurance 
penetration (Beenstock and al.; 1986, Outreville; 1996). Truett and Truett (1990) and Browne and 
Kim (1993) found a positive relationship between the life insurance consumption and level of 
                                                 
 
 
2
However, their sample takes into account that only three countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that are South Africa, Côte 
d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe.  
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schooling. They explain this result by the fact that a higher level of education increases the ability 
of agents to understand the benefits in risk management and long-term saving (life insurance). 
However, Beck and Webb (2003) showed that the school enrollment rate, the life expectancy, the 
young dependency ratio and the size of the social security system did not have strong link with 
the life insurance consumption in 68 countries from 1960 to 2000. Table A-1 in appendix 
summarizes the potential determinants of the life insurance and their expected sign. 
However, despite that, these studies showed that the economic and institutional factors influence 
the life insurance sector development; they are not exempt of some shortcomings. Indeed, the 
most previous studies have not analyzed the effect of the institutional quality both on the life 
insurance penetration and density. Moreover, they have taken into account that developed and 
emerging countries and were not interested in Sub-Saharan Africa countries, where the legal 
environment is less solid. In this context, our study tries to fill this gap and contribute to the 
previous literature by identifying the determinants of life insurance sector development and 
analyzing the role of the quality of institutions on the relationship between economic 
development and life insurance development on a sample of 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In this way, we highlight the heterogeneity of the effect of the economic development level on 
the life insurance according to the quality of the legal and political environment.  
3. Variables and stylized facts 
3.1. The variables and their sources 
According to literature (Beck and Webb; 2003, Arena; 2008, Avram and al, 2010, etc.), the two 
indicators usually used to measure the life insurance development are the life insurance 
penetration and life insurance density. Indeed, the life insurance penetration defined as the ratio 
of premium volume to GDP. It measures the importance of insurance activity relative to the size 
of the economy. As for life insurance density is measured by premiums per capita, expressed in 
US dollars. This measure shows how much each inhabitant of the country spends on average on 
life insurance (Beck and Webb, 2003).Unlike previous studies which have used the one or the 
other of its indicators in their analyzes (Arena; 2008, Haiss and Sümegi; 2008, Han and al., 2010, 
etc.), we employ two alternative measures (insurance penetration and insurance density) of life 
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insurance activities development. The life insurance penetration and density
3
 are obtained from 
Financial Structure and Economic Development Database of Beck and Al-Hussainy Ed (2013). 
The indicators of the institutions quality are coming from diverse sources. These variables were 
mainly used in the previous empirical studies on the life insurance sector. First, we selected two 
indicators from the database of Economic Freedom Heritage Foundation (2014). Thus, we have 
Property_Rights that is an assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, 
secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. They also measure the quality of the 
legal system of the country to protect individuals and their financial assets. The second indicator 
is Fiscal freedom which measures the tax burden imposed by Government. It includes both the 
direct tax burden in terms of the top tax rates on individual and corporate incomes and the overall 
amount of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. In scoring fiscal freedom, the underlined 
numerical variables are weighted equally as one-third of the component. We anticipate an 
increase in the burden of the tax has a negative effect on the premiums and the benefits of life 
insurance companies, so a reduction of life insurance sector development. The last two indicators 
of the quality of institutions come from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. 
LawOrder measures the strength and independence of the judicial system, the degree to which 
citizens of a country are able to use legal systems to mediate disputes and enforce contracts. 
Thus, with the improvement of the rule of law in a country, we expect that the protection and 
enforcement of property rights derive facilitate the transaction of life insurance. The last is 
Government_stability. It measures the ability of governments to realize the programs they have 
planned and to remain in place. Thus, the lack of political stability shortens the economic horizon 
of life insurance potential purchasers and suppliers and reduces life insurance market 
development. Before to submit our indicators of the quality of institutions in the econometric 
estimations, we normalize by the following formula: 
      
                
                   
, where           and           represent the minimum and 
maximum of each indicator of the quality of institutions. This transformation permits to have a 
                                                 
 
 
3
 Density was calculated from indicators of life insurance penetration , the total population and GDP  
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range between 0 and 1. The higher values indicate better quality of institutions. Thus, the 
standardization facilitates direct comparison across different equations. 
The different variables used are those analyzed in the theoretical literature as potential 
determinants of life insurance activities development. Thus, we have the economic development 
level, measured by the real GDP per capita. In addition to the income per capita, one have 
identified two economic and financial indicators that include, the real interest rate and the index 
of financial development measured by the liquidity ratio in the economy. According to the 
demographic elements we have, the life expectancy at birth, the young dependency ratio (ratio of 
the population under age 15 to the population ages 15-65) and old dependency ratio (ratio of the 
population over age 65 to the population ages 15-65). As mentioned in the empirical literature, 
this study also divides the dependency ratio into young and old dependency because the life 
insurance products provide indemnity for two risks: mortality and longevity risk (Chang and Lee, 
2012). This leaves consider the different age groups demand different types of indemnities, where 
the divergent effects of demographic factors on life insurance development. All these variables 
are extracted in the database of World Development Indicators (WDI, 2014). Table A-2 in the 
appendix shows the list of Sub-Saharan African countries selected. 
3.2. Stylized facts 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of life insurance penetration in the different economic regions over 
the period 1996 to 2011. We remark out in the Euro zone, the life insurance penetration in the 
other regions is inferior to 1% of GDP. Indeed, the life insurance contributes weakly to domestic 
income in developing countries (Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Europe 
Central and Asia). The life insurance development seems to be related the economic development 
level and this is confirmed by the curve of the Euro zone and the East Asia and Pacific.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Life insurance penetration in the economic regions, 1996-2011 
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Figure 2 shows a ranking of life insurance penetration and density in 20 countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. As we can see, life insurance development has very little to do with the size of a country. 
Nigeria which has the largest economy by far among these countries of the sample, has a smaller 
life insurance penetration and density countries than Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, and Côte 
d'Ivoire. Indeed, if we consider the life insurance penetration (Figure 2.a), the countries whose 
life insurance sector is more developed are Botswana, Malawi and Kenya. The countries with the 
highest life insurance density (Figure 2b) are Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire and Sénégal. Moreover, we 
see that the countries like Ghana and Zambia occupy the last place in terms of density while they 
are well classified at the life insurance penetration. 
 
 
Figure 2: Ranking of countries according to the life insurance penetration (a) and density (b) on 
the average for the period 1996-2011. 
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a) 
 
(b)
 
Source: Beck T. et Al-Hussainy Ed. (2013) and author’s calculations 
 
If we use the Table 1 below, we note that on the average, Gabon is the country that spends much 
money per capita (2239.516 $ US) for life insurance consumption during the period 1996-2011, it 
is followed by Côte d'Ivoire (2071.566 $ US) and Sénégal (886.572$ US). However, Zambia is 
the country that spends less than 1$ US per capita for life insurance consumption. She is preceded 
by Ethiopia and Ghana whose the life insurance density is to 1.035 $ US and US 1.616 $ US 
respectively. In summary, the statistical analyzes show that the measure of the life insurance 
development varies according to the indicator used; hence the need to take into account the two 
measures in our econometric analysis, to identify the factors that influence the life insurance 
premiums development. 
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Table 1: Life insurance penetration and density over the period 1996 to 2011 
Countries Life insurance penetration Life insurance density  Countries Life insurance penetration Life insurance density 
Angola 0.049 23.143 Malawi 0.631 272.335 
Botswana 1.319 386.079 Mali 0.052 59.613 
Burkina Faso 0.146 279.208 Mozambique 0.138 8.282 
Cameroon 0.189 811.644 Niger 0.058 82.926 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.515 2071.566 Nigeria 0.098 253.840 
Ethiopia 0.028 1.035 Sénégal 0.251 886.572 
Gabon 0.160 2239.516 Tanzania 0.103 294.175 
Ghana 0.195 1.616 Togo 0.314 573.184 
Kenya 0.732 243.720 Uganda 0.045 227.432 
Madagascar 0.075 21.853 Zambia 0.332 0.9160 
Source: Beck T. et Al-Hussainy Ed. (2013) and author’s calculations 
4. Econometric Methodology and estimation technique 
The definition of a structural model for the life insurance development is not easy. Beck and 
Webb (2003) have indicated that the life insurance premium reflects both the demand and supply 
and highlighted the difficulties to distinguish between supply and demand for life insurance. 
Nevertheless, we can follow Outreville (1996), who defines a reduced model of life insurance 
two models of life insurance demand and supply. Indeed, according to Outreville, the life 
insurance demand is a function of the competitive structure of the domestic market and of the 
country's level of financial development and supply is also related to the commercial price of 
insurance, interest rates and other factors relating to market structure (Outreville, 1996). Thus, as 
life insurance premiums bought at the market is equal to the average price of one unit of 
insurance coverage (  ) multiplied by the quantity of insurance protection needed in life    , the 
reduced-form can be defined by: 
                             4                                                                                       
Where   is a vector of demographic variables,   represents the vector of macroeconomic 
variables and financial variables and   the vector of indicators of the institutions quality that can 
to influence the life insurance demand and supply. After transformation, the linear model of life 
insurance development can be written again in the following form: 
                                                                                                        
                                                 
 
 
4
 We tried to modify the basic model of Outreville (1996), for example, we have replaced the market structure in the 
supply level by the quality of institutions. 
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Where    measures the indicator of the life insurance sector development (Life insurance 
penetration or density),     vector of the demographic variables (Life expectancy, Young and old 
dependency ratio),      is a vector of economic and financial variables (GDP per capita, real 
interest rate and financial development) and     the vector of indicators of the institutions quality 
(Property Rights, Fiscal Freedom, Law order and Government stability) for the country   in 
period  .         and    are unknown parameters to be estimated.     and   country fixed 
effects, time fixed effects, and the idiosyncratic error term, respectively. 
The estimation of factors that influence the life insurance premiums (equation 2) raises a number 
of issues that the endogeneity bias is most important problem. This problem may originate form a 
number of sources. Firstly, the endogeneity bias can arise from measurement errors in the 
regressor variables. Secondly, our measure of income per capita for example, could be correlated 
with other relevant determinants of life insurance premiums omitted. Finally, the most important 
problem, especially in this case may come mainly from the reverse causality between income per 
capita and life insurance premiums. Indeed, the literature has shown that there is a double 
causality between the life insurance development and real income per capita (Ward and 
Zurbruegg, 2000). Then, other studies have shown that the life insurance premiums have a 
positive effect on GDP per capita (Arena; 2008, Avram and al.; 2010, Lee and al.; 2013, etc.). 
These problems above could lead to a statistical bias in the estimated on regressors, with 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), estimates exaggerating its impact of GDP per capita for example. 
In order to control this eventual simultaneity bias, we estimate equation (2) with the 
heteroskedastic-efficient two-step generalized method of moments (IV-GMM) estimator which 
generates efficient coefficients as well as consistent standard errors estimates. Indeed, the 
efficiency gains of this estimator relative to the traditional IV/2SLS estimator derive from the use 
of the optimal weighting matrix, the over-identifying restrictions of the model, and the relaxation 
of the independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) assumption. For an exactly-identified 
model, the efficient GMM and traditional IV/2SLS estimators coincide, and under the 
assumptions of conditional homoskedasticity and independence, the efficient GMM estimator is 
the traditional IV/2SLS estimator (Baum et al. 2007). This technique requires the identification of 
variables that best explain the proxy of economic development (real GDP per capita) and which 
have not of the direct impact on the life insurance premiums. Thus, in our econometric estimates, 
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we choose the rainfall
5
 lagged one year as an instrument of income per capita. Indeed, the rainfall 
has been used by Brückner (2011) as an instrument of income per capita to analyze the impact of 
economic growth and the size of the agricultural sector on the urbanization rate. In addition to 
rainfall, we use the income per capita and the domestic saving rate lagged two years as an 
instrument of income per capita. The underlying assumption is that these instruments do not have 
direct impact on the life insurance premiums, their only impact being indirect through the channel 
of income per capita.  
5. Results 
5.1. Baseline estimate results 
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of econometric estimates the determinants of life insurance 
penetration and density over the period from 1996 to 2011. As we treat the endogeneity problem, 
the validity of our results depends on the quality of the instruments which are submitted to 
diagnostic tests that are the over-identification test of Hansen and the weak instruments of Cragg-
Donald. The first stage estimation results of all the regressions show that our instruments are 
valid and this is confirmed by the statistics of the over-identification test of Hansen that is robust 
to heteroscedasticity and whose probability not allow to reject the hypothesis that the instruments 
are exogenous. Moreover, the comparison of Cragg-Donald statistics to critical values calculated 
by Stock and Yogo (2004) indicates the absence of the weak instruments problem because the 
Cragg-Donald statistics are higher. 
The column (1) of table 2 take into account the income per capita and demographic indicators 
only. The results show that the income per capita is a significant determinant of life insurance 
penetration. For example, an increase by one standard deviation of GDP per capita leads to an 
increase the life insurance penetration of 37.716% (column 1). The life insurance penetration 
increases with the economic development level in the Sub-Saharan African (SSA). The life 
                                                 
 
 
5
The data on year-to-year variations in rainfall are from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP), version 2.1 (Adler et al., 2003). These data are available from 
1979 and to 2009. The rainfall data come at a high resolution (0.5°x0.5° latitude-longitude grid) and each rainfall 
observation in a given grid is constructed by interpolation of rainfall observed by all stations operating in that grid. 
Rainfall data are then aggregated to the country level by assigning grids to the geographic borders of countries 
(Bruckner, 2011).  
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expectancy and the young dependency ratio have a negative effects while the old dependency 
ratio positively influences the life insurance penetration. This result is more robust to including 
other variables in the regression (column 2 to 6). The positive effect of income in the SSA region 
is identical of previous studies with different samples and also show that as income increases, the 
life insurance penetration also increases (Fortune; 1973, Beenstock and al.; 1986, Browne and 
Kim; 1993, Outreville; 1996 and Beck and Webb; 2003). The negative effect of life expectancy is 
explained by the decrease of the mortality risk following the increase of life expectancy driving 
to reducing in the life insurance consumption. As for the negative effect of the young dependency 
ratio, it is explained by the fact that with a young dependency ratio high in a context of low 
income (ASS), the households are not able to satisfy their current needs to think about old-age 
insurance subscription and this leads to a decrease of life insurance consumption. Indeed, Chang 
and Lee (2012) showed that the life expectancy and to the young dependency ratio have negative 
effects on the life insurance penetration in countries where the income level is low, which is true 
with our results. Then, Beck and Webb (2003) and Feyen and al (2011) also found a negative 
relationship between the young dependency ratio and the life insurance penetration. However, the 
positive effect of the old dependency ratio on the life insurance penetration indicates that the 
demand for life insurance products increases with the aging population; which is verified by the 
development of the life insurance in developed countries. Furthermore, the different effects of 
young and old dependency ratios reinforce our choice to use them separately in our estimates. As 
for the other economic variables namely the real interest rate ant financial development, they 
have no significant effect on the life insurance penetration in our sample. 
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Table 2: The determinants of life insurance penetration, in a Panel 1996-2011 
 Insurance premiums (%GDP): IV-GMM 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita 0.2257*** 
(0.07570) 
0.224*** 
(0.0777) 
0.223*** 
(0.0800) 
0.225*** 
(0.0799) 
0.252*** 
(0.0792) 
0.225*** 
(0.0769) 
Life expectancy -0.0313*** 
(0.007462) 
-0.0315*** 
(0.00941) 
-0.0368*** 
(0.0103) 
-0.0318*** 
(0.00968) 
-0.0327*** 
(0.00949) 
-0.0316*** 
(0.00936) 
Young Dependency -0.0160*** 
(0.004222) 
-0.0174*** 
(0.00487) 
-0.0175*** 
(0.00507) 
-0.0173*** 
(0.00496) 
-0.0154*** 
(0.00517) 
-0.0174*** 
(0.00489) 
Old Dependency 0.10031*** 
(0 .02978) 
0.115*** 
(0.0347) 
0.134*** 
(0.0420) 
0.113*** 
(0.0355) 
0.101*** 
(0.0314) 
0.113*** 
(0.0364) 
Real Interest rate  -0.000757 
(0.000610) 
-0.000998 
(0.000792) 
-0.000787 
(0.000645) 
-0.000943 
(0.000716) 
-0.000764 
(0.000600) 
Financial_depth  -0.00131 
(0.00380) 
-0.000683 
(0.00390) 
-0.00138 
(0.00407) 
-0.00127 
(0.00406) 
-0.00124 
(0.00387) 
Property_Rights   0.156* 
(0.0904) 
   
LawOrder    -0.0758 
(0.162) 
  
Fiscal_Freedom     -0.123* 
(0.0674) 
 
Government_stability      0.0202 
(0.0789) 
 First stage estimation 
Log (Rainfall) lagged one year -0.10639* 
(0.0562) 
-0.09585* 
(0.0548) 
-0.09601* 
(0.05589) 
-0.09513* 
(0.05729) 
-0.09561 
(0.0588) 
-0.09668* 
(0.0557) 
Real per capita GDP lagged two years 0.74773*** 
(0.09410) 
0.76625*** 
(0.09188) 
0.76687*** 
(0.09139) 
0.7668*** 
(0.09139) 
0.73529*** 
(0.0928) 
0.7669*** 
(0.09281) 
Year dummies Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 
Centered R2 
Number of id 
Hansen J-OID test p-value 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 
Critical value of Stock and Yogo (10%) 
257 
0.457 
20 
0.2838 
212.511 
32.615 
19.93 
246 
0.467 
20 
0.3043 
225.041 
36.732 
19.93 
240 
0.490 
20 
0.3025 
195.287 
28.925 
19.93 
246 
0.469 
20 
0.2837 
221.777 
37.068 
19.93 
240 
0.487 
20 
0.3095 
223.538 
32.557 
19.93 
246 
0.467 
20 
0.3085 
223.66 
35.80 
19.93 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. To correct the effects of scale, we have 
divided GDP per capita by 1000. For the first stage estimation results, we have presented only the coefficients of the 
instruments, but all the exogenous variables are included in the regressions. 
 
The third group of results (column 3-6 of Table 2) that is to say with the legal and political 
variables also confirm that the real income per capita and demographic variables are significantly 
correlated with the life insurance penetration. The quality of the judicial system (LawOrder) and 
political stability (Government_stability) have not significant effect on the life insurance 
penetration. In contrast, the property rights (Property_Rights) positively influences the life 
insurance penetration at 10% level of significativity and fiscal freedom is a measure of the tax 
burden imposed by Government is proved to be negatively significant for the life insurance 
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penetration. Thus, the life insurance penetration is higher if the government relaxes the taxes for 
this sector. This result corroborates the work of Dragos and Dragos (2013) in a sample of 31 
European countries. 
Table 3: The determinants of life insurance density in a Panel 1996-2011 
 Log (Insurance premiums per capita) : IV-GMM 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log (GDP per capita) 1.023** 
(0.445) 
0.835* 
(0.439) 
1.162** 
(0.503) 
0.866** 
(0.436) 
1.037** 
(0.465) 
0.804* 
(0.452) 
Life expectancy -0.0886*** 
(0.0203) 
-0.0807*** 
(0.0258) 
-0.0823*** 
(0.0252) 
-0.0834*** 
(0.0261) 
-0.0858*** 
(0.0253) 
-0.0794*** 
(0.0262) 
Young Dependency 0.0355** 
(0.0152) 
0.0328* 
(0.0183) 
0.0352* 
(0.0186) 
0.0337* 
(0.0185) 
0.0314* 
(0.0178) 
0.0328* 
(0.0183) 
Old Dependency 0.159 
(0.115) 
0.136 
(0.126) 
0.0681 
(0.151) 
0.130 
(0.127) 
0.113 
(0.128) 
0.155 
(0.138) 
Real interest rate  0.00315 
(0.00257) 
0.00237 
(0.00254) 
0.00301 
(0.00259) 
0.00158 
(0.00246) 
0.00324 
(0.00260) 
Financial_depth  0.00287 
(0.00617) 
0.00299 
(0.00614) 
0.00196 
(0.00609) 
0.00457 
(0.00643) 
0.00224 
(0.00608) 
Property_Rights   0.533* 
(0.295) 
   
LawOrder    -0.263 
(0.373) 
  
Fiscal_Freedom     -0.407** 
(0.202) 
 
Government_stability      0.313* 
(0.175) 
 First stage estimation 
Log (Rainfall) lagged one year -0.07796* 
(0.04025) 
-0.0602 
(0.03981) 
0.05538 
(0.0396) 
-0.05655 
(0.03991) 
-0.0539 
(0.04133) 
-0.05402 
(0.03812) 
Real per capita GDP lagged two years 0.2252*** 
(0.0368) 
0.2388*** 
(0.0374) 
0.2078*** 
(0.03772) 
0.24194*** 
(0.0371) 
0.21798*** 
(0.0338) 
0.23383*** 
(0.0363) 
Year dummies yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
Centered R2 
Number of id 
Hansen J-OID test p-value 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 
Critical value of Stock and Yogo (10%) 
257 
0.527 
20 
0.9175 
44.33 
22.32 
19.93 
246 
0.520 
20 
0.9613 
44.30 
23.62 
19.93 
240 
0.557 
20 
0.9223 
31.90 
17.77 
19.93 
246 
0.522 
20 
0.9975 
44.889 
24.380 
19.93 
240 
0.563 
20 
0.9346 
38.700 
23.959 
19.93 
246 
0.521 
20 
0.9784 
44.458 
22.890 
19.93 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For the first stage estimation results, we 
have presented only the coefficients of the instruments, but all the exogenous variables are included in the 
regressions. 
 
The estimations on life insurance penetration are replicated with the logarithm of the life 
insurance density and are reported in Table 3. The results indicate that the income level in 
logarithm explain the variation in life insurance density in all the regressions. We observe that the 
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income elasticity of life insurance demand is greater than unity: which signify that a variation 
income per capita leads to a greater variation of life insurance density (column 1, 3, and 5). Thus, 
the results show that the life insurance is a luxury good in our sample of SSA countries. This 
result was also found by Ward and Zurbruegg (2002) indicating that the estimated effect of 
income on the life insurance development is higher for developing economies in Asia than for 
developed countries in OECD. The effect of life expectancy remains negative while the effect of 
the young dependency ratio becomes positive with the life insurance density. Thus, we can say 
that the impact of demographic factors on life insurance depends on the measure of life 
insurance. As for the old age dependency ratio, its effect on the life insurance density is not 
significant but remains positive sign. The effect of financial development and real interest on the 
life insurance density remains not significant. Furthermore, the effect of the quality of the judicial 
system (LawOrder) on the life insurance density remains insignificant as in the case of the life 
insurance penetration while the property rights (Property_Rights) is also significant. This result 
confirms that of Avram et al. (2010) which showed that the property rights influence positively 
the life insurance density. Finally, the political stability has a positive effect on the life insurance 
density. Thus, we confirm the results of Ward and Zurbruegg (2002) which showed that the 
political stability exerts a significant impact on life insurance demand both in developed and 
developing countries. As for fiscal freedom, its sign remains negative and significant on the life 
insurance density as above with the life insurance penetration. 
 
5.2. Robustness checks 
In this subsection, we conducted additional analyzes to confirm the robustness of our findings 
above. We add the variables identified in the literature likely to affect the life insurance 
premiums. These additional variables are enrollment rate at the secondary (Education), foreign 
direct investment inflows (FDI), remittances inflows and the mandatory contribution rate for 
social security (Social_Security) as a proxy for the size of the social security. We replace the 
young and old dependency ratios by the dependency ratio (ratio of people younger than 15 or 
older than 64 to population ages 15-64) in order to capture the overall effect as it has been done 
in one of the previous studies (Chang and Lee, 2012). These variables are also from the database 
of the World Bank.  
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The results of estimation to instrumental variable (IV) with heteroscedasticity correction are 
reported in Tables 4 and 5. The diagnostic statistics are favorable because the over-identification 
test of Hansen and the weak instruments of Cragg-Donald show that all our instruments are valid.  
The results are qualitatively the same; which confirms the robustness of our results. The income 
per capita remains a significant determinant of life insurance penetration, as well as demographic 
factors preserve their signs (Table 4). The size of the social security negatively influences the life 
insurance penetration (column 2), while foreign direct investment exert a positive effect. The 
negative impact of social security suggests that a social security system well-developed reduces 
incentives and the need to buy pension products of the life insurance sector. The work of Ward 
and Zurbruegg (2002) and Feyen and al (2011) also found a negative effect of social security on 
the life insurance consumption which reinforces our results. The positive effect of foreign direct 
investment was also found by Carson et al (2014). The remittances reduce the insurance 
penetration (column 1) and that is justified to the extent that the funds received from migrants 
constitute a sort of life insurance for other family members stayed in the country. According to 
the institutional indicators, they retain all their sign but only the governmental stability has a 
significant positive effect on the life insurance penetration. 
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Tableau 4: Additional variables on the determinants of life insurance penetration 
 Insurance premiums (%GDP): IV-GMM 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP per capita 0.4537*** 
(0.1152) 
0.3899*** 
(0.0946) 
0.4434*** 
(0.1504) 
0.5110*** 
(0.1541) 
0.4480*** 
(0.1233) 
0.5191*** 
(0.1564) 
0.4478*** 
(0.168) 
0.5173*** 
(0.1431) 
Life expectancy -0.0259*** 
(0.00992) 
-0.0256 
(0.0201) 
0.0122 
(0.0160) 
0.00184 
(0.0155) 
-0.0193 
(0.0179) 
0.00386 
(0.0141) 
0.0154 
(0.0169) 
-0.00534 
(0.0145) 
Dependency_age -0.0128*** 
(0.00419) 
-0.0221*** 
(0.00603) 
-0.0277*** 
(0.00997) 
-0.0207*** 
(0.00717) 
-0.0185*** 
(0.00692) 
-0.0204*** 
(0.00713) 
-0.0259** 
(0.0107) 
-0.0196*** 
(0.00710) 
Realint 0.00103 
(0.00107) 
-7.65e-05 
(0.00138) 
-8.19e-05 
(0.00243) 
0.000157 
(0.00160) 
-0.000238 
(0.00128) 
0.000153 
(0.00155) 
-0.000603 
(0.00273) 
0.000229 
(0.00144) 
Financial_depth -0.00474 
(0.00532) 
-0.00361 
(0.00609) 
-0.00122 
(0.00754) 
-0.00348 
(0.00583) 
-0.00948 
(0.00668) 
-0.00366 
(0.00573) 
-0.00156 
(0.00786) 
-0.00440 
(0.00563) 
Social_Security  -0.00389* 
(0.00197) 
-0.00190 
(0.00201) 
   -0.00169 
(0.00232) 
 
 
FDI  0.0106*** 
(0.00315) 
0.0151*** 
(0.00424) 
0.0144*** 
(0.00331) 
0.0118*** 
(0.00363) 
0.0142*** 
(0.00347) 
0.0142*** 
(0.00458) 
0.0142*** 
(0.00365) 
Remittance -0.0126** 
(0.00517) 
       
Education   -0.00270 
(0.00506) 
-0.00213 
(0.00425) 
-0.0102** 
(0.00490) 
-0.00211 
(0.00425) 
-0.00284 
(0.00510) 
-0.00123 
(0.00418) 
Property_Rights    0.0324 
(0.125) 
    
LawOrder     -0.399 
(0.258) 
   
Fiscal_Freedom      -0.0234 
(0.0783) 
-0.0209 
(0.143) 
 
Government_stability        0.208*** 
(0.0701) 
Year dummies Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 
Observations 218 144 109 153 155 153 107 155 
Centered R2 0.525 0.531 0.427 0.412 0.503 0.410 0.428 0.421 
Number of countries 20 12 12 17 17 17 12 17 
Hansen J-OID test p-value 0.9003 0.9623 0.4736 0.7556 0.7051 0.7502 0.4048 0.8843 
Cragg–Donald stat 118.840 50.927 145.002 213.497 166.652 217.463 117.914 238.612 
Critical value (10%) 19.93 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. To correct the effects of scale, we have 
divided GDP per capita by 1000. For the first stage estimation results, we have presented only the coefficients of the 
instruments, but all the exogenous variables are included in the regressions. 
 
The results of estimation on the life insurance density with added variables (Table 5) also confirm 
the effects of different variables on the life insurance density. Thus, the life insurance remains a 
luxury good in SSA because income elasticities are all greater than unity. However, the social 
security, the education and the remittance have not significant impact on the life insurance 
density. In addition, the institutional variables such as the tax burden (Fiscal) and the 
governmental stability (Government_stability) have significant effects and retain their sign on the 
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life insurance density. The effect of property rights (Property_Rights) on the life insurance 
density remains also significant while that of the rule of law (LawOrder) is not significant. 
Tableau 5: Additional variables on the determinants of life insurance density 
 Log (Insurance premiums per capita) : IV-GMM 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log (GDP per capita) 1.248** 
(0.576) 
2.02723** 
(0.5521) 
2.369*** 
(0.531) 
1.988*** 
(0.613) 
1.627** 
(0.623) 
2.543*** 
(0.545) 
2.3538*** 
(0.6717) 
2.821*** 
(0.505) 
Life expectancy -0.076*** 
(0.0246) 
-0.050*** 
(0.01802) 
0.00180 
(0.0354) 
-0.074* 
(0.0404) 
-0.094** 
(0.0402) 
-0.0296 
(0.0281) 
-0.01646 
(0.0325) 
-0.0308 
(0.0311) 
Dependency_age 0.0439*** 
(0.0166) 
-0.00697 
(0.01328) 
0.0186 
(0.0319) 
0.0550** 
(0.0265) 
0.0596** 
(0.0269) 
0.0226 
(0.0222) 
0.0098 
(0.0329) 
0.0290 
(0.0240) 
Real interest rate 0.00478 
(0.00353) 
0.00496 
(0.00345) 
0.00290 
(0.00373) 
0.00192 
(0.00291) 
0.00207 
(0.00299) 
0.00196 
(0.00282) 
0.00109 
(0.0042) 
0.00261 
(0.00276) 
Financial_depth 0.00438 
(0.00666) 
0.03125*** 
(0.00847) 
0.0243*** 
(0.00897) 
0.00502 
(0.00844) 
0.00392 
(0.00755) 
0.0185** 
(0.00806) 
0.0220** 
(0.0111) 
0.0171** 
(0.0080) 
Social_Security  0.006813 
(0.0074) 
0.00297 
(0.00720) 
   -0.00009 
(0.0075) 
 
FDI (% GDP)  0.029252*** 
(0.01032) 
0.0300*** 
(0.00887) 
0.0165* 
(0.00893) 
0.0134 
(0.00920) 
0.0344*** 
(0.00797) 
0.0353*** 
(0.0095) 
0.0294*** 
(0.00761) 
Remittance (%GDP) -0.0204 
(0.0136) 
       
Education   0.0128 
(0.0151) 
0.00668 
(0.0107) 
0.00433 
(0.0112) 
0.0131 
(0.0124) 
0.011763 
(0.0142) 
0.0124 
(0.0130) 
Property_Rights    0.702** 
(0.342) 
    
LawOrder     0.739* 
(0.428) 
   
Fiscal_Freedom      -0.611** 
(0.237) 
-0.71694 
(0.48567) 
 
Government_stability        0.555*** 
(0.177) 
 First stage estimation 
Log (Rainfall) lagged one 
year 
-0.06351 
(0.03992) 
-0.08844* 
(0.05118) 
-0.02789 
(0.0437) 
-0.01795 
(0.04328) 
-0.02382 
(0.04350) 
-0.03114 
(0.04113) 
-0.03454 
(0.04334) 
-0.03331 
(0.03965) 
Real per capita GDP lagged 
two years 
0.1753*** 
(0.02933) 
0.18978*** 
(0.03593) 
0.27392*** 
(0.0381) 
0.26195*** 
(0.04644) 
0.2682*** 
(0.04552) 
0.2764*** 
(0.03631) 
0.2566*** 
(0.0412) 
0.2886*** 
(0.03920) 
Year dummies  yes no no yes yes no no no 
Observations 
Centered R2 
Number of id 
Hansen J-OID test p-value 
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat. 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
stat. 
Critical value of Stock and 
Yogo (10%) 
222 
0.556 
20 
0.7563 
23.672 
19.987 
 
19.93 
147 
0.5398 
12 
0.7319 
24.508 
16.671 
 
19.93 
114 
0.546 
12 
0.8285 
47.811 
27.473 
 
19.93 
159 
0.610 
17 
0.5325 
26.344 
16.203 
 
19.93 
161 
0.620 
17 
0.4474 
29.887 
17.885 
 
19.93 
159 
0.569 
17 
0.8457 
41.331 
30.219 
 
19.93 
110 
0.5653 
12 
0.9206 
28.220 
20.241 
 
19.93 
161 
0.558 
17 
0.8807 
48.121 
28.406 
 
19.93 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For the first stage estimation results, we 
have presented only the coefficients of the instruments, but all the exogenous variables are included in the 
regressions. 
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5.3. Exploring of role of the institutions quality in the economic development effect 
Even though the developing countries share some common characteristics, there are some 
differences between them, including, their socio-political and institutional contexts. Furthermore, 
even though our results above show that the income per capita is a significant determinant of life 
insurance development, we believe that the heterogeneity in terms of the quality of the legal and 
policy environment can affect the life insurance level but also on the impact of the economic 
development level on the life insurance penetration. In this context, we test five possible sources 
of heterogeneity: the property rights, the rule of law, the fiscal freedom, the government stability 
and the colonization proxies by legal system. Indeed, the literature has shown that the financial 
sector is generally more developed in the British legal system countries where the judicial system 
stresses on the private rights of individuals including their property rights (La Porta and al. 1998). 
In return, in the legal system of French origin, the government plays an important role in the 
financial sector particularly in the insurance sector by the presence of social security companies 
that may be competitors of the life insurance companies. 
To capture the role of the quality of the judicial and political system in the relationship between 
income per capita and the life insurance penetration, we define the following equation: 
      
    
          
         
               
        
    
                              
Where     is life insurance penetration and      represents the institutional indicators that 
measures the strength of the domestic institutions for the country   in period    Here, we 
empirically test that,   
     the coefficient on the interaction term between GDP per capita and 
institutional variable is statistically significant. The underlying assumption is that the quality of 
institutions is likely to improve or reduce the impact of income per capita on the life insurance 
premiums. Thus, if    
   , the effect of income per capita on the life insurance penetration is 
weak in countries where high-quality institutions. And, if    
   , the effect of GDP per capita 
on life insurance penetration increases with the quality of institutions. In summary, the total 
marginal effect of real income on the life insurance penetration measured by:     
    
      
means that the reactivity of the life insurance penetration that result to the variation of income 
depends on the quality of institutions (   ). 
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We estimate the equation (3) by always using the heteroskedastic-efficient two-step generalized 
method of moments (IV-GMM) estimator developed by Baum and al (2007). In addition to the 
instruments used in estimate equation (2) above, the variable of interaction between the 
institutions quality and rainfall lagged two years is also used as an instrument. The estimation 
results of the fixed effect panel with instrumental variable are reported in Table 6. The 
diagnostics tests of the first stage show that our estimates are robust because in all regressions, 
the over-identification test of Hansen and weak instruments of Cragg-Donald are valid.  
In column (1), the estimated coefficient of the interaction between the protection of property 
rights and real GDP per capita is negative and significantly different from zero. Thus, there is an 
unfavourable effect of property rights on the impact of GDP per capita on life insurance 
penetration. Indeed, the impact of economic development is weak in the countries whose private 
property rights are high. All countries in the sample that are below the threshold, the effect of 
income on life insurance penetration is weak while it is high for countries at above the threshold.  
Columns (2), (3) and (4) indicate that the quality of the judicial system (rule of law), the fiscal 
freedom and the political stability not significantly influence the impact of income on the life 
insurance penetration because the interaction coefficients are not significant. Furthermore, we 
observe that the effect of income per capita differs widely between the French and British legal 
system countries. The coefficient of interaction with the French legal system (column 5) is 
significantly negative which suggests that the marginal effect of income per capita on the life 
insurance penetration is low for French legal system countries. Specifically, a 1% increase in 
GDP per capita leads to a 0.5366% increase in life insurance penetration for non-French legal 
country. This compares with a 0.0071% increase for a country in French legal system ceteris 
paribus. This situation is explained by the strong presence of the state in the economic system of 
the French legal system countries through the creation of social security companies for 
employees of public and private sector.  
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Tableau 6: Heterogeneity in the economic development effect on life insurance penetration. 
 Insurance premiums (%GDP): IV-GMM 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP per capita 0.345*** 
(0.100) 
0.627** 
(0.313) 
0.202** 
(0.0923) 
0.285*** 
(0.0942) 
0.53663*** 
(0.13910) 
GDP per capita*Property_Rights -0.327*** 
(0.119) 
    
Property_Rights 0.258*** 
(0.0819) 
    
Life expectancy -0.0273*** 
(0.00968) 
-0.0426*** 
(0.0104) 
-0.0407*** 
(0.00852) 
-0.00651 
(0.00487) 
-0.0240*** 
(0.00679) 
Young Dependency -0.0152*** 
(0.00464) 
-0.0155*** 
(0.00469) 
-0.0111** 
(0.00439) 
-0.0296*** 
(0.00530) 
-0.0081** 
(0.00369) 
Old Dependency  0.0640 
(0.0403) 
0.121*** 
(0.0347) 
0.0758** 
(0.0324) 
0.0965*** 
(0.0361) 
0.04904* 
(0.02549) 
Real interest rate 0.000367 
(0.000690) 
-0.000770 
(0.000584) 
-0.000775 
(0.000724) 
-0.000892 
(0.000574) 
0.000392 
(0.00042) 
Financial_depth -0.000461 
(0.00365) 
-0.00106 
(0.00363) 
-0.00332 
(0.00375) 
0.00548** 
(0.00257) 
-0.003648 
(0.00326) 
GDP per Capita*LawOrder  -0.751 
(0.517) 
   
LawOrder  0.406 
(0.297) 
   
GDP per capita*Fiscal_Freedom   0.0777 
(0.0630) 
  
Fiscal_Freedom   0.127 
(0.0966) 
  
GDP*Government_stability    -0.116 
(0.0992) 
 
Government_stability    0.159** 
(0.0774) 
 
GDP per capita*French     -0.5295*** 
(0.1400) 
 First stage estimation 
Log (Rainfall) lagged one year -0.10288** 
(0.05124) 
-0.07937* 
(0.04593) 
-0.07957 
(0.04868) 
0.08997** 
(0.03777) 
-0.06361 
(0.05391) 
 Rainfall*Institutions indicators lagged two years 0.023407 
(0.02871) 
-0.1220*** 
(0.04960) 
-0.14017* 
(0.07340) 
-0.004281 
(0.00396) 
-0.07708 
(0.08816) 
Real per capita GDP lagged two years 0.58626*** 
(0.08779) 
0.41410*** 
(0.12589) 
0.67453*** 
(0.09894) 
0.7350*** 
(0.07824) 
0.53198*** 
(0.0886) 
Year dummies yes yes yes no yes 
Observations 
R-squared 
Number of id 
Hansen J-OID test p-value 
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat. 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat. 
Critical value of Stock and Yogo (5%) 
236 
0.514 
20 
0.3827 
117.929 
18.058 
13.91 
246 
0.491 
20 
0.3052 
47.772 
6.986 
13.91 
236 
0.482 
20 
0.0940 
110.430 
31.707 
13.91 
246 
0.411 
20 
0.7137 
195.388 
48.476 
13.91 
246 
0.506 
20 
0.3762 
80.596 
18.908 
13.91 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. To correct the effects of scale, we have 
divided GDP per capita by 1000. For the first stage estimation results, we have presented only the coefficients of the 
instruments, but all the exogenous variables are included in the regressions. 
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6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this paper we explored the main factors that drive the development of the life insurance sector 
and the role of the institutions quality in development economic effect on life insurance 
penetration in 20 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa from 1996 to 2011. Our work contributes to 
the empirical literature by using at a time the life insurance penetration and density as a measure 
of the life insurance sector development and adding explanatory variables such as the quality of 
the legal and political system. 
The results of the life insurance regressions confirm some of the findings of previous empirical 
research on life insurance and add some additional findings. We find that income per capita is an 
important determinant of life insurance and that life insurance is a luxury good in Sub-Saharan 
African country. The impact of economic development on the life insurance depends on socio-
political and institutional contexts. The demographic factors such as the life expectancy and the 
young dependency ratio have a negative and significant influence on the life insurance 
penetration and insurance density. In return, when the old dependency ratio increases, the life 
insurance penetration increases. Finally, the results show that the quality of the legal and political 
environment improves the emergence of the life insurance sector. In addition, an increase in the 
size of the social security system hinders the life insurance sector development, by partly 
reducing the need for insurance but also by reducing the level of disposable income net of taxes 
and contributions. 
Generally, these results provide a number of important policy implications. The positive effect of 
private property rights on life insurance suggests that a better legal system with improved private 
property rights would facilitate rapid development of the life insurance sector. Then, the positive 
effect of political stability recommends the pursuit of reforms in the political environment in 
order to strengthen investor confidence in the insurance sector, particularly the life insurance. 
However despite the contribution of this work, it has some limits that the future research could 
take into account the factors that influence the insurance sector development. For example, the 
future studies could include the variables such as population density, structure and regulation of 
the life insurance market. In addition the study could be expanded to non-life insurance sector.  
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Appendix 
Table A-1: Determinants of life insurance and their expected sign 
Variables Expected sign Justifications 
Economic variables   
Income + The increase in income per capita should lead to an increase in life insurance 
consumption because individuals will have enough means to subscribe to an 
insurance with the aim to maintain their income in case of death. 
Real interest rate +/- The increase in real interest rate increase the profitability of insurer’s placements 
who in turn will provide the strong financial assessment and to attract the potential 
life insurance applicants (Beck and Webb, 2003). But an increase in interest rate 
can leads to a substitution of the life insurance to bank deposits 
Financial development + The financial development contributes to strengthening the  confidence of the life 
insurance consumer’s 
Social Security - The increase in government spending in the social security reduces the need for 
individuals to acquire a protection through the life insurance 
Institutional variables   
Property Rights  + A strengthening of property rights makes it more favorable legal and regulatory 
framework for the insurance industry development 
Rule of Law + An improvement of Rule of Law in a country reinforce  the protection and the 
application of the property right for to facilitate the life insurance transaction 
Fiscal Freedom  - An increase of the tax burden have a negative effect on the premiums and the 
profits of life insurance companies, thus a reduction of the insurance industry 
development. 
Government  stability + The political instability shackle the financial development and consequently a 
stable political environment stimulates the life insurance development. 
Demographic variables   
Life expectancy +/- A high life expectancy leads to an increase of the savings component through life 
insurance especially the annuity component and / or decrease the mortality risk 
component 
Young dependency ratio +/- Increasing the mortality risk component and/or decreasing the savings component  
Old dependency ratio +/- Increasing the saving component and/or the mortality risk component  
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Table A-2: List of countries 
Angola, Angola, Botswana, Burkina, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Sénégal, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia. 
Table A-3: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.  
 
Min Max 
Life insurance penetration 288 0.2722882 0.3521372 0.011 2.645 
Life insurance density 288 456.0538 665.5353 0.427174 2885.916 
GDP per capita 320 1082.384 1671.193 129.5231 7628.723 
Life expectancy 320 52.64017 5.153914 40.77578 63.7989 
Young Dependency Ratio 320 5.836393 1.176905 4.7655 11.24931 
Old Dependency Ratio 320 85.32202 9.746554 54.42328 105.1271 
Dependency ratio 320 91.15841 9.552795 60.07084 110.5901 
Real interest rate 298 8.330733 14.28889 -94.21996 93.91508 
Financial development 317 23.66522 8.712524 6.914201 54.03433 
Property_Rights 312 0.6209207 0.2276376 0 1 
LawOder 300 0.4904445 0.2323199 0 1 
Fiscal_Freedom 312 0.4304792 0.2672678 -7.27e-08 1 
Government_stability 300 0.3503111 0.195411 -3.98e-07 1 
Social Security 189 3.985979 6.855506 0 33.61 
FDI 320 3.399121 4.392516 -8.589433 40.16725 
Education 196 29.80096 17.37159 5.16489 81.70265 
Remittance 285 2.259679 2.855364 0.000197 13.0426 
French 320 0.4 0.4906652 0 1 
 
 
